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The profile of the international cyber offender in
the U.S.
Lora Hadzhidimova∗, Old Dominion University, U.S.A
Brian Payne, Old Dominion University, U.S.A
Abstract:
This study explores the characteristics of international cyber offenders prosecuted in the U.S. Our findings to a
large extent correspond with general studies about cyber offenders with a few important exceptions. First, the
average age of the offenders in our study is slightly higher than others that do not focus exclusively on inter-
national offenders. Second, while this research confirms that China is among the leading country in committing
cybercrimes when it comes to committing particular types of cybercrimes, the offenders come from other countries
as well such as Romania, Estonia, Ukraine, South Africa, and Nigeria. Third, our results show that in each of the
cases from the sample, the international offenders received prison sentences alone, or complemented with a fine
or restitution. In addition, the sentence length of citizens of African countries is significantly higher than the ones
of citizens of other geographic regions. Prison sentences for cyber frauds and identity thefts were also found to be
much lengthier than sentences for other types of cybercrimes. Implications are provided.
Introduction
Cybercrime is a serious threat that faces the contemporary world. Reports show that the cost of
cybercrime increased from $445 billion in 2014 to $600 billion in 2017 (Lau, 2018). The international
scope of the acts, the anonymity of the perpetrators, and the obstacles that criminal justice agencies
confront, exacerbate the cybercrime dilemma. In addition, many studies have found it difficult to com-
pare the characteristics of cyber offenders and their sentences, a problem that could be attributed to
the substantially different laws of countries prosecuting the offenders. The diverse legislative systems
are also why international agreements about cybersecurity and extradition of criminals, in general,
have been unsuccessful. Furthermore, some strategies that work in some countries may not work in
others because of cultural, political and administrative reasons.
To understand appropriate criminological responses to cybercrime, it is essential to empirically
assess internationally-focused data about cyber offenders. It is especially important to examine the
environment from which cyber offenders are coming from, which is usually their country of origin, and
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the environment in which they are inflicting the damages, which is usually where they are prosecu-
ted. These environments should be assessed and compared in their complexity, based on the different
conditions they create for facilitating or hindering cybercrime acts. Additionally, while some types of
cybercrimes could be triggered by the nature of the political relationship between states, others could
stem from economic reasons. To better understand international dynamics, we examine the characte-
ristics of a non-U.S. sample of cyber offenders that were prosecuted in the U.S.
Review of Literature
Cybercrime typologies tend to focus on three different themes: (1) characteristics of offenders,
(2) types of crimes committed by cyber offenders, and (3) sentences given to cyber offenders. While
researchers have routinely identified the global nature of cybercrime as being one of the challenges to
responding to these offenses and offenders, few studies have considered the international dynamics in
relation to cybercriminal characteristics, cybercrime types, and sentencing patterns. In the following
section, each of these areas are discussed with an aim towards providing an international framework
for understanding and explaining cyber offending and the criminal justice system’s response to these
offenses.
Characteristics of Cybercriminals and International Issues
Research on the characteristics of cyber criminals has examined the demographic characteristics
of cyber offenders (age and gender), their belonging to a political entity (citizenship), and their behavi-
oral patterns (collaboration with other criminals). According to studies, the “stereotypical” perpetrator
of a cybercrime is “male, 12-28 years old, single, and socially dysfunctional, possibly from a dysfuncti-
onal family” (Rogers, 2011, p. 223). However, Rogers (2011) adds that these particular factors are not
the most essential in outlining a profile for cybercriminals; rather, he notes that it is more important
to understand the context guiding the illicit activities. Others stress that it is also essential in more
individualized profiling to collect information about the offenders’ level of technical know-how, their
personal traits, social characteristics, and their motivation (Saroha, 2014).
Cybercrimes are committed worldwide with such ease that sometimes events that appear to be
happening from another continent are in fact much closer to the victim than it appears. Courts en-
counter obstacles in identifying the jurisdiction that has to handle the case. The first step toward
resolving this issue is determining the citizenship of the perpetrator. According to international law,
most countries respect the principle of extraterritoriality, which allows the authorities in the country of
citizenship of the offender to take over the case regardless of the location of the crime (Grabosky, 2004).
Two countries that have hostile relationships could compete over jurisdictional aspects, especially if
an act is considered a crime in one legislative system but not a crime in the perpetrator’s country of
origin. All these dynamics lead Grabosky (2004) to conclude that “nations that lag behind the leaders
risk becoming havens for cybercriminals of the future”, (p.155).
Holt and Kilger (2012) call for more studies that include foreign citizens and their involvement
in cyber and physical criminal acts. In addition, they suggest that researchers devote more time to
exploring the elements that could result in cyberattacks against a foreign country’s critical infrastruc-
ture. Rush et al. (2009) note that Russia, China, Brazil and India are leading nations in terms of the
number of cybercrimes committed. In this regard, the cyber offender’s country of origin, according to
Brenner (2008), could have an underlying importance especially in places with authoritarian regimes
in which the anonymity provides protection against repressive acts of violence for one’s political ac-
tions. In addition, cultural factors may increase the likelihood of cyber offending (Yun et al., 2016).
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Moreover, a cyber offender’s country of origin and its law enforcement capabilities and legislative fra-
mework to fight cybercrime could also impact the perpetrator’s determination to commit cybercrimes
(Chang, 2013). Their legal awareness also plays a role in this process in which it is important to look
at the average level of this component in different countries as this could contribute to addressing why
some of their features appear to be conducive to cybercrime (Fedushko & Bardyn, 2013).
Additionally, cybercriminals employ different means for data encryption through which they en-
sure anonymity of their actions in cyberspace. They present a serious challenge to both law enforce-
ment units and prosecutors, especially in countries with limited resources and training (Denning &
Baugh, 1999; Grabosky, 2007). Moreover, the diplomatic and historical relationships between the two
political entities could also affect to a large extent the level of cooperation between law enforcement
officials (e.g., Japan with Burma, Cambodia, China, Laos, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam, see Kat-
zenstein & Okawara, 2002) or the lack of such, as is the case of China and Taiwan (Chang, 2012).
Political tension between nations could also facilitate transnational cybercrime. On the other hand, a
close relationship between the entities could limit the scope of cybercrime if agencies join efforts to
combat the problem.
Another reason why more studies that examine characteristics of cyber offenders are necessary
is the complexity of perpetrator networks that include foreign citizens that commit organized crimes
using cyberspace (Leukfeldt, Lavorgna & Kleemans, 2017). An interview-based study conducted by
Hutchings (2014) reveals the interconnectedness between cyber offenders and their readiness to colla-
borate in crimes. Typically, they execute the coordinated acts either in an attempt to profit from the
crime financially, or in other cases, in pursuit of a political agenda set by their governments, other
governmental or non-governmental entities, or themselves (Choo & Smith, 2008).
Cybercrime Types and International Issues
Two of the most common types of crimes are cyber fraud and identity theft. The 2017 Internet
Crime Complaint Center (IC3) report shows that the number of victims of identity theft was 17,636
and the victims of confidence/romance fraud combined with those of credit card fraud were more than
15,500 (IC3, 2017). Research that focuses on cyber frauds finds that the perpetrators of these parti-
cular crimes are predominantly male, residents of densely populated urban areas, often with some
international background, living in Eastern Europe, America, or Canada, and are usually not acting
as representatives of their employers but in an individual capacity (Fried, 2001). However, some cyber
fraud types are frequently committed by citizens of nations outside of these areas, but they also sup-
port the findings of the average cyber offender – males under the age of 30 (Warner, 2011). The same
study also highlights that cyber frauds in Ghana are widespread, mainly identity fraud, frauds invol-
ving investments in gold mining, and estate fraud – the first two have targets that reside in Western
countries, whereas the latter have targets that are mostly citizens of the offender’s home country.
The central role of subcultures becomes apparent in other cybercrimes as well. Hacking, for in-
stance, inspired the formation of a subculture among cybercriminals that emerged as a result of dif-
ferent levels of technological understanding (Holt, 2010). In this case, the conditions that the home
country provides could also enable or restrict the access to knowledge that the hacker has. Another
aspect of the hacking subculture is the element of entertainment that this activity brings to the hac-
ker community. Turgeman-Goldschmidt (2005) argues that “seeking fun, knowledge, and computer
virtuosity” (p.18) is what triggers the decision to engage in hacking.
The role of subcultures might apply differently in other forms of cybercrime. Consider, for example,
theft of secrets rather than being connected to a “hacking subculture.” The theft of secrets could also
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take the shape of economic espionage if the criminal acts are conducted to feed into the political agenda
of a state different than the one from which the secrets were stolen. What is problematic for law en-
forcement and prosecution in such cases is that there should be very strong evidence in support of
the fact that the theft of secrets was in support and by request of foreign governments (Fidler, 2013).
In cases of cyber espionage, it is even more important to identify the nationalities of the perpetrators
and the authorities that they serve. Moreover, an established relationship of antagonism and lack of
diplomatic relations between states and political entities could increase cyber espionage threats, as
is the case with Chinese political behavior to Tibet (Deibert et al., 2009). According to some, China
poses one of the biggest threats to cybersecurity. In terms of espionage practices, researchers confirm
that it conducted a series of operations in order to obtain classified information from its political rivals
(Hjortdal, 2011).
As for web defacement, the same conclusions are also valid, thus supporting the notion that poli-
tical climate in the perpetrator’s home country should be studied in detail. Holt et al. (2017) discovered
that individuals “who supported the suppression of minority and outgroups in society” were more likely
to engage in web defacement of government websites (p. 369).
When it comes to the cultural explanations of cybercrime, the cyber offender’s country of origin
can demonstrate some unique characteristics related to the target of the offense and the consequences
that could follow from committing the crime. For instance, Holt and Copes (2010) conducted a study
examining the subculture of digital piracy. Their findings show that digital pirates share a common
understanding about the right to receive and disseminate information, while at the same time, they
distinguish themselves from those who seek to gain profit from digital piracy. The sample that they
used includes pirates from countries on three different continents (North America, Europe and Au-
stralia). The interviewees shared that they have little concern for the eventual legal consequences of
their actions because of the perception that they will not get caught. The reality, however, could be
quite different depending on the effectiveness not only of the law enforcement system but also of the
judiciary in a country. Particularly in the case of digital piracy, different cultures could have different
motives to perceive these crimes as “victimless”. In other words, while subcultures in cybercrime net-
works exist independently from countries of origin “to share the meaning of specific ideas, material
objects, and practices through interaction” (Williams & Copes, 2005, p.70), each member of the group
could have followed a different path that led them to share these symbols of the cyberculture. The
latter is a fact for which the country of origin and its culture may be responsible in the way it shapes
the relationships in society both in terms of interpersonal interactions and the relationship between
the state’s administration and its citizens.
A critical assessment of the problem with music piracy, in particular, brings another perspective
in regard to rationalizing the actions of individuals violating intellectual property laws. Some argue
governments and industries establish control over the access to music and information that music pi-
rates attempt to dismantle and rebel against (Hinduja, 2006; 2008). The power that these structures
have in different countries could vary, thus, justifications for digital piracy by the pirates themselves
could also differ depending on how they perceive them and their role in the process of distributing di-
gital art products. A study by Hinduja and Higgins (2011) explored the typical characteristics of music
pirates. The results showed that males were represented slightly more than females in the sample in
terms of downloading frequency, similar to what is established in the literature: males typically out-
number females in pirating digital content in general (Higgins, 2006; Hollinger, 1993; Rahim et al.,
1999; Sims et al., 1996; Solomon & O’Brien, 1990; Wood & Glass, 1996). The profile also revealed that
mostly unemployed students, particularly those majoring in the social sciences, were illegally down-
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loading content. In terms of age, 57.6% of offenders who engaged in digital piracy were 19 years of age
or younger (Hinduja & Higgins, 2011).
Piracy and intellectual property violations receive a great deal of scholarly attention in the in-
ternational literature. As Rutter and Bryce (2008) note, a study conducted across 68 nations by the
International Intellectual Property Association showed that between 2000 and 2005, software piracy
and counterfeiting increased by 100% (International Intellectual Property Association, 2006). Busi-
nesses selling counterfeit goods refer to a specific type of consumer culture that makes the user eager
to own luxury goods. These illicit activities comprise of an entire business branch that was estimated
by Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development to be worth approximately $200 billion
in 2005 (Gistri et al., 2009). Contrary to stereotypes that describe the average users/customers of pi-
rated software/counterfeit clothing as low-educated groups with blue-collar occupations, in a study
from China, Cheung and Prendergast (2006) found that white-collar males are the biggest consumers
of counterfeit/pirated goods. These findings reaffirm that international studies of cybercrimes should
definitely account for culture in countries of residence/origin of the offenders.
Sentencing Cyber Offenders and International Issues
While the literature exploring sentences for traditional types of crime is voluminous and empiri-
cally diverse, there is a lack of studies focusing on the sentencing patterns of cybercrimes, especially
those sentencing of international cyber offenders. One of the first studies that fills the gap in the
literature in regard to the cybercrime sentencing is conducted by Marcum, Higgins and Tewksbury
(2011). Among the most important findings from this study is the one that confirms a tendency that
the authors highlight themselves – that the criminals who committed the most prosecuted cybercrimes
(credit card fraud and identity theft) received lengthier sentences. In another study by Marcum, Hig-
gins and Tewksbury (2012), the researchers cite U.S. Department of Justice data showing that between
2006 and 2010, 51.7% of the sentenced cybercriminals received prison time.
Smith, Grabosky and Urbas (2004) stress four major issues for prosecutors in international cases.
First, establishing whose jurisdiction the case falls under is difficult. Second, the amount of evidence
that is or could be collected to prosecute the case may present challenges. Third, establishing who
the offender is and their physical location can be difficult. Fourth, resolving problems related to the
possibility of extradition and bi-lateral agreements for legal assistance has the potential to create
challenges.
It is clear that cybercrime is an international problem and cybercriminals come from all over the
world. The international nature of these offenses and offenders has grown exponentially as the use
of technology has spread across the world. What this means is that the potential for international
cyber offending has grown dramatically. Many prior conclusions about the international aspects of
cyber offending were from ancillary findings whose focus was on cybercrime in general as opposed to
focusing specifically on the international issues associated with cyber offending.
There is a gap in the literature when it comes to comparative studies that explore sentencing
patterns of cybercriminals across jurisdictions. Smith, Grabosky and Urbas argue that this could be
attributed to a few problems, among which “imprecise and disparate definitions of computer crime that
exist in many jurisdictions, the fact that many offences are prosecuted in lower level courts whose ju-
dge’s sentencing remarks are often not transcribed or reported, and the fact that computer crimes have
only recently become prevalent enough to warrant special judicial attention to the collection of empi-
rical data” (Smith, Grabosky, & Urbas, 2004, p. 125). While it is difficult to compare sentences across
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jurisdictions, it is also important that research on cybercrime focus on the relationship between offen-
ding and citizenship/country of permanent residence. Therefore, in order to avoid comparing different
jurisdictions but to still account for the international component in cyber offending, this study includes
only on one jurisdiction (U.S.) but captures the different nationalities of cybercriminals and the vari-
ety of cybercrimes they commit. This study examines the profile of the international cyber offender in
the U.S. based on personal characteristics of the offender, the types of cybercrimes they commit and
responses to their actions by the U.S. criminal justice system. In this context, “international” indicates
a non-U.S. citizen.
Focusing specifically on the international nature of cybercrimes and cybercriminals, the following
questions are addressed: (1) What are the characteristics of international cyber offenders who are
prosecuted in the U.S.; (2) What types of cybercrimes are committed by international cyber offenders
prosecuted in the U.S.; (3) What are the normative patterns appearing to connect international cyber-
criminals with the types of crimes they commit; (4) What sentences are given to international cyber
offenders; and (5) What are the patterns guiding the criminal sentences given to cyber offenders?
Methods
Data
This study uses data extracted from U.S. Department of Justice press releases between January
2009 and December 2017. The sample includes 225 offenders who are citizens of a foreign country and
have been involved in an overall sample of 123 cases in which 414 crimes were committed. It should
be noted that one cyber offender was involved in two separate cases.
Measure
Variables included age, gender, country of origin, number of group offenses, number of different
types of offenses, and the sanction types that appear in press releases. Furthermore, we cross-tabulated
the different cybercrime types with the countries of origin of the offenders. In addition, we outlined the
leading countries in each offense category. Next, we conducted t-tests to examine if the average age of
offenders were statistically significant when compared to offenders’ gender. We repeated the same test
for prison length by gender, prison length by geographic region, and prison length by offense type.
Analytic Plan
We created a coding sheet focused on three categories: personal characteristics about the per-
petrator, crime-related characteristics, and sentence-related characteristics. The first section gathered
data about the age, gender, and country of origin of the offender. The second section captured whe-
ther the offenders worked individually or with others, the average number of offenders in a particular
case, the target of the offense, the types of the offenses, and the leading countries when it comes to
a particular kind of cybercrime. The third category examined data that outline the criminal justice
response to the cybercrime, the length of the sentence (if known), the amount of the fine, if any, and
the restitution amount. Additional tests were conducted to identify the average age and prison lengths
of the offenders by gender, country of origin, and offense type. Based on the results, we discuss the
sentencing patterns and other specifics that our study revealed.
Results
Personal Characteristics
The minimum age of cyber offenders is 19 years and the maximum is 73. The average age of
cyber offenders is 34.79 (N=181). As illustrated in Table 1, males are the predominant offenders, with
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94% (212 out of 225) in the examined sample. Only 6% or 13 out of 225 offenders are female. The
most frequently represented country of origin of cyber offenders (N=225) when all cybercrimes are
considered is China (26.7%), followed by Romania (11.6%) and Russia (7.1%). Cyber offenders also
came from Estonia (5.3%), Mexico (4%), Canada (4%), South Africa (3.6%), Nigeria (3.6%), Ukraine
(3.1%), and Pakistan (3.1%). Other descriptive statistics are described in Table 1a-f.
Table 1a. Descriptive statistics: Offenders by age
Minimum Maximum Mean
Age (N=182) 19 73 34.79
Table 1b. Descriptive statistics: Offenders by gender
N %
Gender (N=225) 19 73
Men 212 94.20
Women 13 5.80
Table 1c. Descriptive statistics: Offenders by country of origin
N %

























Dominican Republic 2 0.9
U.K. 2 0.9
Other 15 6.7
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Computer Systems 70 31
Personal and financial information 38 17
Trade secrets 37 16
Table 1f. Descriptive Statistics: Type of cyber offense
N %
Type of Cyber Offense (N=225)
Fraud 101 44.9
Hacking 74 32.9
Counterfeit goods 57 25.3
Identity theft 53 23.6
Unauthorized access 49 21.8
Theft of secrets 38 16.9
Online sales fraud 13 5.8
Digital piracy 10 4.4
Phishing 6 2.7
Spamming 6 2.7
Securities fraud 5 2.2
Destruction of property 1 0.5
Web defacement 1 0.4
Note. The percentage calculated for this category is based
on the number of offenders (N=225) and not on the total
number of offenses (N=414) and thus the total sum in th
is column exceeds 100%.
Crime-related Characteristics
The number of offenders involved in cybercrimes ranged from one to 29. The average number of
offenders was 4.91. More than two-thirds of offenders (68.4%) were working in groups. As for the most
frequently observed offense target, material and digital goods represented over 35% of overall targets
of offense. Besides targeting goods, the end-goals of the cybercrimes also included computer systems
(31%), personal and financial information (17%), and trade secrets (16%).
In terms of the types of cyber offenses that were committed, the results of our study show that
cyber fraud is the predominant offense. The second most frequent cyber offense is hacking, followed
by crimes involving counterfeit goods, identity theft, and unauthorized access. Data pointing to coun-
tries of citizenship of the offenders who commit the most commonly encountered cyber offenses are
presented in Table 2. The leading countries, from which cyber offenders committing fraud mostly come
from are Romania (17%), and Russia (12%). In terms of hacking, the offenders come from 27 different
countries among which the leading one is Estonia (15%), followed by Romania (14%). China is where
most offenders involved in counterfeit goods come from, with 47% of the overall 57 crimes, followed by
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Mexico with 16%. China is also the leading country for theft of secrets. In fact, 84% of theft of secret
offenses involved offenders from China. Citizens of Russia and Romania (each with 16%), followed by
citizens of China (with 12%) are among the most frequent offenders who obtain unauthorized access
to devices. South Africans (15%), followed by Nigerians and Ukrainians (both with 13%) commit the
most identity theft.
Table 2. Citizenship of Offenders by the Most Frequently Committed Type of Cybercrimes
Citizenship of offenders Leading N Second Leading N
by cybercrime type Country (%) Country (%)
Fraud (N=101) Romania 17 Russia 12
(16.83%) (11.88%)
Hacking (N=74) Estonia 11 Romania 10
(14.86%) (13.52%)
Counterfeit goods (N=57) China 27 Mexico 9
(47.37%) (15.79%)
Identity theft (N=53) South Africa 8 Nigeria/Ukraine 7
(15.09%) (13.21%)
Unauthorized access (N=49) Russia/Romania 8 China 6
(16.33%) (12.25%)
Theft of secrets (N=38) China 32 Canada 3
(84.21%) (7.89%)
The Criminal Justice Response to Non-U.S. Cybercriminals
The results of this part of our study, summarized in Table 3, reveal that for 71 of the 225 offenders,
the sentence is known and involves incarceration as a sanction. The other imposed sanctions include
restitution and fine. Probation was not imposed as a sanction in any of the cases from the research
sample – a fact that will be explained later.
Table 3. Sanction Types in Sentences for Cybercrimes
Sanction types in N % Minimum Maximum Mean
sentences (N=71)
Incarceration 71 100 1 day 115 years 7 months
Restitution 21 9.3 $4,820 $55,080,226 $3,249,993
Fine 7 3.1 $4,000 $100,000 $30,142
Further analysis of the data showed that the average age of male offenders who were sentenced
is 34.86 years, and 44.67 for female offenders. Since all of the known sentences involve incarceration,
we also inquired about the length of incarceration by gender. On average, female criminals receive 12
months and males 94 months. We also compared the average prison length by country of origin of the
offenders, grouped in regions that generally overlap with the different continents, except for Europe
due to a clear distinction made in the literature between the offenders coming from Eastern Europe and
Western Europe. As shown in Table 4, citizens of African countries received the lengthiest sentences
– 409 months (with a median of 141 months). Prison sentences received by citizens of other areas
were lower: Eastern Europe - 50 months, Asia - 48 months, North America (excluding U.S. citizens) -
45, Western Europe - 41 months, and South America - 38 months. Additionally, sentences for identity
theft and fraud also reveal statistical significance when it comes to comparing them with other types
of crime. While the average prison sentence for identity theft is 235 months, frauds it is 159 months,
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whereas sentences for other types of crimes vary from 24 months for counterfeit goods to 76 months
for theft of secrets. Small sample sizes warrant that these findings be interpreted with caution. Long
sentences for a small group of offenders could skew the averages.
Table 4. Analyses of Prison Length by Gender, Age, Country of origin and Offense type
Mean s.d. t Range
Age by Gender (years)
Male (N=56) 34.86 9.642 (22-73)
Female (N=3) 44.67 11.93 (31-53)
Prison length by Gender (months)
Male (N=66) 93.55 214.745 (0.3-1380)
Female (N=5) 12.206 2.489 (9-16)
Prison Length by geographic region (months)
Africa (N=8) 408.88 535.72 −5.53∗∗∗(51-1380)
Eastern Europe (N=18) 49.72 34.19 0.9 (8-135)
Asia (N=29) 48.22 41.48 1.34 (0.3-156)
North America (N=8) 44.75 39.68 0.62 (3-133)
Western Europe (N=4) 40.5 19.21 0.47 (12-54)
South America (N=4) 37.76 55.1 0.49 (3-120)
Prison Length by Offense Type (months)
Hacking (N=21) 65.33 42.65 0.59 (12-156)
Fraud (N=29) 158.79 312.55 −2.48∗ (12-1380)
Theft of Secrets (N=6) 76 32.55 0.14 (36-133)
Counterfeit goods (N=24) 24.43 22.84 1.87 (0.3 - 87)
Identity theft (N=16) 235.25 408.51 −3.47∗∗∗(16-1380)
Unauthorized access (N=12) 61.5 45.88 0.53 (16-180)
Phishing (N=2) 59 1.41 0.2 (58-60)
Spamming (N=3) 51 3 0.31 (48-54)
Online sales fraud (N=7) 38.86 25.54 0.65 (8-87)
Digital piracy (N=2) 36 33.94 0.36 (12-60)
*p≤.05, **p≤.01, ***p≤.001.
Note. Citizens of the U.S. are not included in the Northern American region because of the focus of
this study, except for one case in which the offender acted as a spy on behalf of China. Also, crimes
such as destruction of property, web defacement, and securities fraud are not included in the table
because the sentencing in these cases either has not had occurred before the end of the data collec-
tion or the case in which it was known was only one.
Discussion
The findings from this study parallel many findings from past studies (Rogers, 2011; Rush et al.,
2009; Hutchings, 2014; Fried, 2001; Warner, 2011; Marcum, Higgins & Tewksbury, 2011), while also
providing new insight on the international patterns seemingly guiding cyber offending. For example,
like other studies, this study showed that cyber offenders tend to be predominantly male, many of
whom from countries that are political adversaries to the U.S. At the same time, differences regar-
ding offender age, the inclusion of a high number of offenders from certain countries, group offending,
and cybercrime types, shed some light on new ways to understand the international nature of cyber
offending.
In terms of age, our findings show that the average age of cyber offenders is slightly higher than
the average age established from previous studies. It is possible that our exclusion of U.S. citizens in
this study increased the average age of the sample. When it comes to young international citizens, all
of the obstacles standing in the way of prosecuting cybercrimes become even more complicated with
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the presence of an individual who could be underage according to the jurisdiction of their country of
origin. That could be a legitimate reason for why U.S. prosecutors are hesitant to pursue cases against
young international cyber offenders. For instance, it is possible that an offender who is 18-years-old
or under is from a country where the laws for juveniles are much lighter than the ones in the U.S. In
this case, the jurisdictional issues and the resources allocated for resolving it could simply make the
prosecutor unlikely to continue with the proceedings.
The results pertaining to the countries of origin of the cyber offenders also correspond to a large
extent to the ones that previous studies suggested, except for one intriguing finding that this study
underlines – that the number of Romanian cyber offenders exceeds the number of Russian ones. In a
political context, China, Russia, and Iran are typically considered adversaries to the U.S., both in the
physical and in the cyber domain. However, it appears that citizens of an Eastern-European country
are represented much more than Russians who supposedly have political motivation to commit these
criminal acts. While the numbers for Romania are surprising due to the fact that Washington does not
have an antagonistic relationship with Bucharest, it is established in the literature that Eastern Eu-
ropean countries are well known perpetrators of cybercrimes (Fried, 2001). Both Romania and Estonia
are members of the European Union and NATO, so speculations about the nature of the cybercrimes as
being politically triggered would be out of place. That said, since politically driven cyber-attacks could
be excluded, a deeper analysis of the cultural and socio-economic conditions in these parts of Europe
could probably explain why Eastern European citizens are among the most frequent perpetrators of
cybercrimes, and particularly, specific types of cybercrimes for which they are prosecuted in the U.S.
The group dynamics of cyber offending uncovered in this study are consistent with prior research.
According to our results, cybercriminals acting internationally are very often in collaboration with ci-
tizens of other countries. It is also common that different people in the organized cybercrime group
execute different roles in the process of achieving the desired result. In cases of more elaborate sche-
mes, it is possible that some of the participants do not even have specific interaction with devices but
instead, facilitate the illicit actions of other members of the group. The former could involve offenders
with knowledge in finance, economics, management, marketing and other fields. Academics and prac-
titioners alike emphasize that cybercrimes increasingly include a broader scope, involving multiple
countries and nationals of different states, and that they work increasingly in groups and not indi-
vidually. Namely, the latter is an element that facilitates the execution of the cybercrime operation
and creates various obstacles to the prosecution in terms of determining the physical location of the
criminals, and the jurisdiction that should handle the case (Smith, Grabosky & Urbas, 2004).
Regarding crime types, the results show that fraud is the predominant cybercrime committed.
This is interesting given that many cases of fraud are not reported by victims because of shame (Cross,
2015). The overrepresentation of fraud cases could be due to the fact that they are more likely to have
identifiable victims, even if victims are often unlikely to report their experiences.
An additional finding that our study reveals pertains to the countries of origin of the offenders
committing these crimes. While media attention focuses on frauds by individuals from African coun-
tries, it appears that they come predominantly from Eastern Europe, and more concretely from Rus-
sia, Romania, and Estonia. Similar conclusions can be drawn about hacking. Estonia and Romania are
again the leading countries in this cybercrime category. All these results point to the question, what
do these countries have in common and why are these cybercrimes so attractive to individuals coming
from these countries – both questions that the literature should explore further considering cultural,
political and socio-economic factors. When it comes to counterfeit goods and theft of secrets, however,
we found that China is the leading country whose citizens commit the vast majority of these crimes –
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a finding that also corresponds with previous studies. A large body of literature has been devoted to
cyber schemes originating in some African countries. Our study confirms that mostly citizens of South
Africa and Nigeria commit identity theft. In our sample, Ukraine is second in identity theft, sharing
the same numbers with Nigeria. Previous studies frequently mention Eastern-European countries as
places from where a large number of cybercrimes originate, especially fraud, and as our study showed,
also hacking, unauthorized access and identity theft.
The results for the sentencing patterns of international citizens prosecuted in the U.S. also reveal
some similarities with previous studies. The high number of prison sentences, for example, is consis-
tent with prior research, though these findings show an even higher number than other studies do. In
fact, all of the offenders in our sample with known sentences received a prison sentence. It is plausible
that these sentences reflect a decision by prosecutors to focus on the most serious cases. In compari-
son to these results, statistics from the U.S. Department of Justice that include American citizens as
well as internationals highlighted that 51.7% of sentenced cybercriminals received prison time (Mar-
cum, Higgins and Tewksbury, 2012). The percentage of prison sentences in a non-U.S.-cybercriminals
sample exceeded the one that included U.S. citizens by almost two-fold. This tendency could be attri-
buted to various factors, among which, the fact that cybercrimes with international perpetrators are
prosecuted only in certain cases with a high likelihood of resulting in a sentence. Another factor that
could contribute to this explanation is that for U.S. citizens, the criminal justice system measures that
could be imposed exceed the ones that could be successfully applied to international cybercriminals.
For instance, probation in cases involving international cybercriminals could be inapplicable due to
them being a high-level risk of flight beyond the U.S. border. Or, it simply could be that because our
sample focused on press releases, less serious cases were excluded from our analysis. These tendencies
in sentencing international cyber offenders should be further explored and analyzed by scholars.
The last set of findings in our study concerns the most commonly committed cyber offenses and
from which countries these offenders are from. We found that the sentences of citizens from countries
in Africa are significantly different than the ones given to criminals living in other geographic regions.
These results should be revisited again considering some context: that identity theft is the fourth
most frequently appearing offense in our sample, and that mostly individuals from South Africa and
Nigeria are the perpetrators. That said, the sentences for identity theft are also statistically different
than the sentences for other offenses, along with cyber fraud. Having in mind these circumstances, two
questions logically follow: is identity theft and fraud judged more severely than other offenses, and are
the perpetrators who happen to commit these crimes perceived as a higher-level threat than others and
are thus sentenced to lengthier periods of incarceration? It is essential to identify whether the crime
takes precedence in decisions about sentencing or the personality and some special characteristics of
offenders. Future studies exclusively focusing on the factors that determine the sentences of cyber
offenders are needed, especially in samples that include foreign citizens.
A few words about the limitations of this study also deserve attention. First, it includes a par-
ticular time-period (2009-2017) which was the only available information on the website of the U.S.
Department of Justice. More than half of the cases that were included in our sample have not had
yet concluded with a sentence. It is also possible that within this period, technological development,
political tensions and cultural factors made some countries stand out more than others in regard to
the number of cybercrime offenders. Furthermore, the average age and gender trends in cyber offen-
ding may have changed in comparison to previous years that are not included in the sample. Second,
not only are there many cybercrimes that remained unreported, but even if reported, the prosecution
may have decided not to continue with the legal proceedings due to the reasons highlighted by Smith,
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Grabosky and Urbas (2004) that were enumerated previously in this essay. Third, because our sam-
ple included press releases, we are potentially excluding cases that prosecutors did not think were
“newsworthy”. What this suggests is that minor cases or less serious cases were excluded. Fourth, it
is possible that some criminal acts look like they would constitute a particular crime but because the
evidence on the case was not sufficient, the individual was indicted for another crime for which the
evidence was sufficient.
An example of this final limitation would be a case involving theft of trade secrets for which
the prosecution did not succeed in collecting evidence for espionage. Title 18, Section 1832 of the U.S.
Code states that the only necessary element for a theft of trade secrets offense would be “that the
thief be aware that the misappropriation will injure the secret’s owner to the benefit of someone else”
(Doyle, 2016, Summary section, para. 1). In order for an offense to qualify for an economic espionage,
it is mandatory that “the thief intend to benefit a foreign government or one of its instrumentalities”
(Doyle, 2016, Summary section, para. 1). In this case, intention may be the difficult aspect to prove.
Moreover, there are some purely procedural issues that make prosecutors unlikely to pursue a case,
such as the different institutions (the Department of Justice, for instance) that have to confirm that the
case is most likely an economic espionage (Nasheri, 2012). Further evidence for this possibility is the
very low number of indictments and sentences for economic espionage mainly conducted by Chinese
nationals even though intelligence services suggest that other governments also frequently commit or
attempt to commit economic espionage (Burstein, 2009).
Conclusion
This study explored the characteristics of international cyber offenders prosecuted in the U.S. To
a large extent, the results from our study overlap with previous findings on the subject matter. The
cyber offenders from our sample were predominantly male, as the literature suggests. Regardless, we
would like to delineate some specifics that do not match previous results. First, the average age of
international cyber offenders is somewhat higher than what the literature has established. Second,
instead of observing major political adversaries of the U.S. as countries from which the most cyber
offenders come from, Romania came in second place, after China, leaving Russia behind in the third
place.
These findings create room for further discussion and empirical studies attempting to explain
why Romanians are prosecuted, and allegedly commit cybercrimes, much more than Russians in the
U.S. In terms of the most commonly observed type of cybercrime, cyber fraud has the highest number
despite the pattern of underreporting and lack of attention by law enforcement that some studies
suggest. Interestingly, sentences with the lengthiest prison time received were not citizens of Eastern
Europe or Asia, but Africa. Lastly, the part of our study researching the U.S. criminal justice response
to international cyber offenders showed that in all of the cases in which the sentence was known, it
involved some prison time.
This conclusion is in full accordance with scholarship maintaining that in order for the prosecu-
tion to proceed with a case involving international citizens, there should not only be sufficient amount
of evidence but also a reasonable expectation that the offender(s) will get a substantial sentence. Sup-
plemental to this finding is also the fact that probation was not imposed as a sanction in any of the
cases of the research sample. This could be attributed to the possibility that first, international citi-
zens present a high international flight risk, and second, that the prison sentences imposed in all of the
cases excluded the opportunity for probation. In terms of juxtaposing sentences of a larger sample of
cyber offenders that include both domestic and international offenders, our study showed a much hig-
International Journal of Cybersecurity Intelligence and Cybercrime, Vol. 2, Iss. 1, Page. 40-55, Publication date: February 2019.
52
Profile of the international cyber offender Hadzhidimova and Payne
her likelihood of international citizens receiving prison time, as compared to the sample that includes
U.S. citizens. Future empirical studies should focus on populations of international citizens prosecuted
in other countries, so that results could be compared to the ones from our study.
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